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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
William Dee Van Komen Jr. appeals from the district court's order 
relinquishing jurisdiction. Van Komen contends the district court violated his Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination by relinquishing jurisdiction 
subsequent to Van Komen's refusal to take a polygraph exam. 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of Proceedings 
Van Komen pied guilty to possession of a controlled substance with the 
intent to deliver. (R., pp.103-117.) The court sentenced him to a five-year 
unified sentence with two years fixed and three years indeterminate and retained 
jurisdiction for up to 180 days. (R., pp.117-120.) After Van Komen successfully 
completed his period of retained jurisdiction, the court placed him on a five-year 
period of probation. (R., pp.133-134.) A little over two years into Van Komen's 
probationary period, the court found Van Kamen in violation but continued him 
on probation. (R., pp.156-167.) 
Some sixth months after being reinstated on probation, the state once 
again asserted Van Komen was in violation of the terms of his probation. (R., 
pp.173-179.) Van Komen admitted to being in violation of his probation by 
having a relationship with a 16-year old girl on juvenile probation and by failing to 
submit to multiple drug tests. (R., p.173; Tr., p. 7, Ls.13-19.) The court revoked 
Van Komen's probation and retained jurisdiction for up to 365 days, once again 
giving him the opportunity to prove himself ready for probation. (R., pp.195-198; 
Tr. , p. 17, Ls. 5-1 3.) 
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In retaining jurisdiction for the second time, the court advised Van Kamen 
that he did not have enough information about his conduct while on probation 
and ordered him to obtain a polygraph examination on the nature of his 
relationship with the minor as well as his sobriety. (Tr., p.17, L.12-p.18, L.8.) 
Van Kamen agreed to "the polygraph arrangement" and was transported for his 
period of retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.18, Ls.16-25.) 
Van Kamen appeared before the court upon the completion of his second 
period of retained jurisdiction. In response to the court's inquiry regarding the 
previously ordered polygraph, Van Kamen, through his attorney, asserted his 
Fifth Amendment right and refused to obtain one: 
[l]n regards to any potential crime, uh, regarding some contact with 
the individual who I believe is a minor, I would advise him to assert 
his Fifth Amendment right as to that, but as to the drug usage I 
don't think there would be a problem in that regard. 
(Tr., p.24, Ls.16-20.) 
The court, concerned with Van Komen's inability to "comply with orders" 
and "comply with the law," imposed sentence after finding it could not trust Van 
Komen's word and could not ensure the safety of the public by again placing Van 




Van Kamen states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it relinquished 
jurisdiction because it violated Mr. Van Komen's Fifth Amendment 
rights? 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Van Kamen failed to demonstrate that consideration of his refusal to 
participate in a polygraph, as ordered by the court, in relation to whether to 
relinquish jurisdiction violated his Fifth Amendment rights? 
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ARGUMENT 
Van Kamen Has Failed To Establish A Violation Of His Fifth Amendment Rights 
A. Introduction 
Van Kamen argues that the court's relinquishment of jurisdiction was an 
abuse of its discretion "because it did so in violation of [his] Fifth Amendment 
rights." (Appellant's brief, p.5.) As part of his argument, Van Kamen also 
contends the district court abused its discretion by imposing the sentence as a 
punishment for Van Komen's refusal to participate in a polygraph examination 
before coming back to court on his retained jurisdiction review. (Id., p.8.) Van 
Komen's arguments fail. Even assuming the district court considered Van 
Komen's refusal to submit to a polygraph in relinquishing jurisdiction, such did 
not implicate his Fifth Amendment rights. Van Kamen has failed to establish an 
abuse of discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. !sL 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion In 
Relinquishing Jurisdiction 
The decision to relinquish jurisdiction is a matter within the sound 
discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse 
of that discretion. See State v. Hood, 102 Idaho 711, 712, 639 P.2d 9, 10 
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(1981 ); State v. Lee, 117 Idaho 203, 205-06, 786 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Ct. App. 
1990). A court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction will not be deemed an abuse 
of discretion if the trial court has sufficient information to determine that a 
suspended sentence and probation would be inappropriate under I.C. § 19-2521. 
State v. Chapel, 107 Idaho 193, 194, 687 P.2d 583, 584 (Ct. App. 1984). 
Contrary to Van Komen's assertions on appeal, a review of the record in this 
case supports the district court's determination that Van Komen was not a 
suitable candidate for a third chance on probation, particularly in light of his 
ongoing failure to be truthful with the court and his potential threat to the 
community. (Tr., p.27, L.4 - p.28, L.19.) 
Prior to being sentenced to his second period of retained jurisdiction, Van 
Kamen admitted to being in violation of his probation by "having a relationship 
with a 16-year-old girl on probation" (R., p.173) and by failing to report to drug 
testing "on multiple dates" (Id.). Although Van Komen's probation officer 
described Van Komen's relationship with A.O. as "romantic" (R., p.169) and one 
where Van Komen "knowingly carried on a relationship with a 16-year-old girl 
involving her in sexual activity and drugs" (R., p.174), Van Komen advised the 
court he did not have sex with A.O. (Tr., p.11, Ls.22-23). Additionally, Van 
Komen advised the court he was "clean" (Tr., p.10, L.16) and had "made bad 
decisions" by not "go[ing] to [his] drug tests" (Tr., p.10, Ls.21-22). 
Concerned with Van Komen's truthfulness at sentencing, the court 
ordered him to obtain a polygraph examination on specific issues prior to the 
review of his period of retained jurisdiction: 
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I'm going to order that you be polygraphed on that issue, 
whether there's been any drug use or alcohol use since March 28th , 
2013, and I'm going to order that you be polygraphed as to whether 
or not you had sexual activity of any kind with [A.O.]. If you test 
deceptive as to either of those things, then I will likely impose the 
prison sentence, have you serve the rest of your time in prison 
regardless of whether you do well on the rider. If you want to 
change your story, now would be the time to do it. If you test 
deceptive after this on either of those two questions, I'll send you to 
prison. 
(Tr., p.17, L.22 - p.18, L.8.) Van Kamen "agree[d) to the polygraph 
arrangement." (Tr., p.18, Ls.16-17.) 
At his retained jurisdiction review hearing, Van Kamen asserted his Fifth 
Amendment right as the reason for failing to obtain a polygraph exam on the 
issue of the nature of his relationship with A.O. and indicated that he was unable 
to obtain an exam while incarcerated on the issue of drug use. (Tr., p.24, L.12 -
p.25, L.5.) The court continued to be concerned with Van Komen's truthfulness, 
especially in light of an allegation that he was attempting to contact a minor 
female while serving his period of retained jurisdiction. (Tr., p.25, L.6 - p.26, 
L.9.) 
Van Kamen has failed to establish any constitutional infirmity in the district 
court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction, in lieu of placing Van Kamen on 
probation, because Van Kamen declined the court's requirement that he obtain a 
polygraph exam in order to establish his truthfulness and readiness for probation. 
Van Kamen argues the polygraph requirement was unconstitutional because it 
would have required a waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights and any agreement 
to take the polygraph came "only after the court announced its intention to 
punish Mr. Van Kamen if he did not participate in the polygraph." (Appellant's 
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brief, p. 7.) Contrary to Van Komen's assertions, the fact that the court gave him 
the choice of waiving his Fifth Amendment privilege and taking a polygraph or 
being subject to his underlying prison sentence instead of being granted another 
shot at probation did not violate his constitutional rights. 
As an initial matter, it bears noting that Idaho's appellate courts have 
already upheld conditions of probation that require a waiver of constitutional 
rights. As long as the condition is reasonably related to the purpose of 
probation, a court may require as a condition of probation that the defendant 
waive his or her Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Josephson, 125 Idaho 119, 
122-23, 867 P.2d 993, 996-97 (Ct. App. 1993). There is no reasoned basis why 
this same principle would not apply to Fifth Amendment waivers. Here, the 
purpose of the exam was to gauge Van Komen's truthfulness to the court in 
determining if he was a good candidate for probation. 
In addition, it is well settled that the Fifth Amendment is not violated 
merely because a state insists as a condition of probation on compelling answers 
to incriminating questions. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 435 n.7 (1984); 
State v. Crowe, 131 Idaho 109, 952 P.2d 1245 (1998). The defendant in Crowe 
pied guilty to sexual abuse of a minor and was placed on probation, the terms of 
which required him to, inter afia, complete a specialized sex offender therapy 
program, submit to polygraph examinations at the request of either his probation 
officer or his sex offender therapist, and report any contact with minor children. 
Crowe, 131 Idaho at 110-11, 952 P.2d at 1246-47. Crowe subsequently failed a 
polygraph examination and, at the request of his therapist, made verbal and 
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written admissions to his probation officer to having unsupervised and sexually 
inappropriate contact with his 10-year-old niece. 1st at 111, 952 P.2d at 1247. 
Based on Crowe's admissions, the district court revoked Crowe's probation and 
ordered his sentence executed. 1st 
On appeal from the order revoking his probation Crowe argued that the 
use against him of the compelled statements that were required as a condition of 
his probation violated his Fifth Amendment rights. 1st at 112, 952 P.2d at 1248. 
Specifically, he argued "that his statements to his counselor should be 
suppressed because the questions posed to him forced him to answer or to be 
punished as a probation violation for asserting his privilege against self-
incrimination," thus forcing him into a "classic penalty" situation. 1st Citing 
Murphy, supra, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected Crowe's argument, noting as 
an initial matter that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination is 
ordinarily subject to waiver merely by the failure to invoke it. Crowe, 131 Idaho 
at 112, 952 P.2d at 1248 (citing Murphy, 465 U.S. at 427-28; Garner v. U.S., 424 
U.S. 648, 654 (1976)). An exception applies "if the State compels an individual 
to forego the Fifth Amendment privilege by a threat to impose a penalty if the 
privilege is invoked"; but that exception is limited "to situations in which the 
statement obtained was to be used in a subsequent criminal proceeding." Id. 
(citing Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434). "[A] State may validly insist on answers to even 
incriminating questions and hence sensibly administer its probation system, as 
long as it recognizes that the required answers may not be used in a criminal 
proceeding and thus eliminates the threat of incrimination." 1st (quoting Murphy, 
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465 U.S. at 436 n.7 (brackets original)). Because Crowe's statements were used 
against him in a probation revocation proceeding, and not in a separate criminal 
proceeding, Crowe was not subject to any new or different penalty and the use of 
the statements did not violate Crowe's Fifth Amendment rights. !fl 
Van Komen argues the court "announced its intention to punish [him] if he 
did not participate in the polygraph." (Appellant's brief, p.7.) As made clear by 
the both the United States Supreme Court in Murphy and the Idaho Supreme 
Court in Crowe, however, a penalty situation arises only when the state seeks to 
use statements compelled as a condition of probation against the probationer in 
a different criminal proceeding. Murphy, 465 U.S. at 436 n.7; Crowe, 131 Idaho 
at 112,952 P.2d at 1248. Although the Fifth Amendment would have precluded 
use of any Van Komen's incriminating statements in subsequent criminal 
proceedings, it did not preclude appropriate evaluations as a condition to 
determine if Van Kamen was a candidate for probation. 
Before ordering the polygraph, the district court noted Van Komen's 
history of not being truthful with the court and provided him with the opportunity 
to provide the court with a complete version of his violations or to obtain a 
polygraph examination on the issues prior to the granting of probation. (Tr., 
p.17, L.5 - p.18, L.9.) That Van Kamen ultimately declined the opportunity to 
"come clean" with the court in favor of a prison sentence does not establish a 
violation of Van Komen's Fifth Amendment rights. Van Kamen has failed to 
show any illegality in either the relinquishment of the court's jurisdiction and 
imposition of sentence or manner in which that sentence was imposed. 
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Finally, the court relinquished jurisdiction, not as a punishment for 
exercising his Fifth Amendment right as Van Komen claims (Appellant's brief, 
p.8), but for his history of untruthfulness and his potential threat to the public: 
The reason that I am revoking your probation is you haven't 
done what I ordered you to do when I sent you on a rider, and that 
was to get a polygraph evaluation to assess both the truthfulness of 
no alcohol or drugs after March 28th , 2013, and the extent of any 
sexual activity with [A.O.]. 
Compounding the problem is the fact that you haven't 
corrected the allegation, and I've read it twice now, I'm not gonna 
[sic] read it a third time, communicating with a minor female, and 
there is no reason for me to disbelieve the Department of 
Corrections. There's no reason - in the report and there's no 
reason for me to disregard or disbelieve the C Note which reads, 
talked to the defendant with the, I assume the lieutenant about his 
contact with underage girl, among other concerns. During the 
meeting defendant was given a direct order by both his CM and the 
lieutenant that he was not to attempt to have any contact by phone 
or mail with this underage girl. Defendant stated he understood. 
This is conduct that's directly related to what you were violated on 
your probation for. It's conduct that occurred only a month ago. 
It does not appear to me that you made any progress as far 
as your ability to comply with my orders, comply with the law. I 
don't think we've made any progress on this rider. This is your 
second CAPP rider. You knew what to expect as far as honesty, 
and you've let me down. I've known you since 2010. It's been four 
years, but there are - there's lies during the arrest, there's lies 
during the presentence interview, there are lies about your drug 
court performance, there were lies in drug court. There have been 
nothing but lies, and I charged you with getting a polygraph to 
convince me that you either were telling the truth or ferret out the 
truth, and you didn't do it, and that's - those are all decisions that 
you're responsible for, and so I can't put you on probation. I don't 
think I can protect the public. I don't think I can protect [A.O.]. 
You indicated to me, to your prior probation officer that 
you're really not all that interested in following the rules of 
probation. 
(Tr., p.27, L.4 - p.28, L.19.) 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgment and 
sentence entered upon the district court's relinquishment of jurisdiction following 
Van Komen's second period of retained jurisdiction. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 4th day of March 2015, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
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JUSTIN M. CURTIS 
DEPUTY STATE AP PELLA TE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
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Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
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